Nature, Self, and Otherness in Naess’ “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World”
Arne Naess is one of the chief thinkers in a movement known as Deep Ecology. Deep Ecology stands in opposition to “shallow ecology,” ecology that ignores humanity’s part in nature. Shallow ecology often appears when people approach environmental issues from an anthropocentric standpoint. Statements such as “ we need to reverse the effects of climate change in order to ensure a future for humanity” or “we must preserve the wildlife on the Galapagos Islands for the sake of the tourist industry” both reflect an inauthentic concern for the environment, a shallow concern rooted in economic interest. Deep ecology pushes for a more authentic concern for the environment, one that cares for the environment for its own sake as something with which humans share a deep connection.
Naess’ main way of pushing for this authentic approach is by connecting ecological concern with self-realization. In short, he argues that people must see themselves as part of nature rather than separate from it, that they must care for the “environmental self.” They must see things in nature as part or extensions of themselves, and must see an authentic being in nature as a key part of their self-realization, their becoming what they are meant to be. There are two key thinkers he draws from in order to develop this idea: Erich Fromm and Baruch Spinoza. From the former he pulls the idea of self-love, the idea that one must love and care for oneself in order to be an adequate caretaker of others, meaning that an authentic love and care for ourselves must inform our concern for the environment, precisely because it is an extension of ourselves. From the latter he pulls the idea that we must strive for self-realization, a self-interest geared towards fulfilling an authentic purpose, meaning that we need to incorporate environmental concern into our development as people.
The strength of Naess’ argument is that he rejects approaches to ecological concern that center economic interest and “practicality” (in this case meaning existing for and causing as little change as possible to daily life). It is admirable how Naess pushes readers to rethink both themselves and nature in order to increase their sense of intrinsic worth in both. However, I would argue that there are two critical shortcomings in Naess’ approach: the first being its pragmatic shortcomings and the second being its evasion of the problem of otherness.
Although I have stated that Naess did well to avoid approaches to ecology that center around some notion of practicality, it should still be noted that some degree of pragmatism is now necessary when dealing with environmental issues. We now face the prospect of not only our own extinction but that of countless other species across the world. It is already too late to fully reverse the damages done by human activity to the environment and, depending on which source one consults, we may have only two to five decades in which we can reverse climate change enough in order to prevent our own extinction and that of countless other species. Philosophically, an ontological approach to humanity’s relationship with nature can address issues that have been neglected in past philosophy and open the way for new and interesting conversations and ways of thinking. However, the possibility of philosophy itself is at stake. If we all die, we cannot have such conversations or adjust our thinking in such ways. What we need in the present moment is not ontology but rhetoric and policy. We need direct and definitive speech and action that may be philosophically incomplete or inauthentic but will nevertheless prevent the impending catastrophe.
The other main problem in the text is that Naess simply eliminates the problem of otherness. I would argue that no ethics is adequate that ignores the inherent otherness that the agent is bound to encounter. Any appeal to identifying with others is going to be limited and often insufficient. For example, Naess brings up the example of a flea that one witnesses dying painfully. Naess argues that one must identify with the flea and see its suffering as suffering that they could possibly experience. However, there are countless other organisms with which we couldn’t do this. I cannot conceive of any way to identify with, for example, a single cell organism that lives at the bottom of the ocean and, as far as I know, such an organism does not suffer. Its life and role has intrinsic worth but I do not see it as part of my immediate world and I can in no way identify with it. I must find ways and reasons to care about it as something other than myself.
Question for further consideration: Is nature other than us? Is it more useful to think of nature as other?
Word count: 797
Work Cited
Naess, Arne. “Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World,” The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology, Edited by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, North Atlantic Books, 1995, pp. 13–30.
